USA v. Geddes by unknown
2007 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-20-2007 
USA v. Geddes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Geddes" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 25. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/25 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the United States Court of*
International Trade, sitting by designation.
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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 06-3335
______
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee
v.
AARON GEDDES,
Appellant
            
Appeal from the
United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00705)
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper
            
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 11, 2007
            
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI , Judge*
(Filed: December 20, 2007)
                     
OPINION
                    
Judge Sloviter agrees that Grier represents the law of the Circuit.  Nonetheless,1
she believes that Geddes’ argument represents the better view, as set forth in her dissent
in Grier.
2
RESTANI, Judge.
This appeal challenges a sentence imposed after remand to apply the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines in an advisory manner as required by United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Defendant Aaron Geddes was found guilty of violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm).  In calculating the Guidelines
range, the District Court imposed a four-level enhancement for using a firearm in
connection with another felony.  The District Court found that the facts necessary to the
enhancement were established by a  preponderance of the evidence.
Geddes’ sole argument on appeal is that due process requires that if a separate
crime is the basis for a sentencing enhancement, the elements of that crime must be found
by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.  Sitting en banc, we recently rejected this
argument, see United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007), and held that
sentencing enhancements, whether constituting a separate offense or not, do not implicate
rights to a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   Id. at 567.1
Accordingly, we will affirm.
